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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/05/2006

Accident number: 213

Accident time: 13:40

Accident Date: 12/08/1998

Where it occurred: Tramosnica, Nr
Gradacac

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: none

Date of main report: [No date recorded]
Name of source: BiH MAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast

Ground condition: building rubble
bushes/scrub
electromagnetic
grass/grazing area
residential/urban

Date record created: 15/02/2004

Date last modified: 15/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate training (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
request for machine to assist (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
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vegetation clearance problem (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
The demining company involved in this accident appear to have been operating two-man
teams with a one-man drill.
A Board of Inquiry report was ordered by the country MAC and carried out by
representatives of the regional MACs and ex-pat Technical Advisors. The report was made
briefly available and the following summarises its content.
The investigators found that the communications system of Motorola radios and cell-phones
worked well. They found that the tools being used were a hand axe, a prodder, large shears,
small pruning shears, a file and a broken end-of-lane marking stick. They found no trip-wire
feelers or metal-detectors on the site. The detectors were apparently available but the high
level of metal contamination meant that they could not be used.
The demining group began work at 07:00. They were working in a small village where many
of the buildings had been destroyed and the rubble was overgrown. The area between the
buildings was also overgrown with grass and bushes. A photograph if the accident site
showed tall grasses and rubble. The demining group were using a two man team and the
victim's partner was 25m back from him in the clearance lane but could not see the victim
because he was working "in a small basin" beside the ruins of a house. The accident
occurred at 13:40, ten minutes after the lunch break.
From the site examination, the investigators decided that the victim knelt on his base stick
and initiated a mine while clearing undergrowth. The victim was found on his back with his
feet towards a crater "about one meter away). The victim later made a brief statement that
he was kneeling to prod when the accident occurred.
The victim's right leg was severely injured and his left thigh and both arms were "less
severe". The medic's "gave an anti-shock infusion and medication for pain". He was taken to
the local hospital within 40 minutes [30 or 40], and later moved to the hospital in Tuzla
[reason not given]. In Tuzla hospital his right leg was amputated above the knee.
The investigators decided that the mine was a surface laid PMA-3 that had been
subsequently covered with debris. The victim's flak-jacket was "damaged" and there was
black residue inside the visor. The report stated that the jacket and visor had reduced the
level of the victim's injury. They thought the length of the working lane (about 120 meters)
and the lack of a tripwire feeler were not directly involved in the incident, but were
"unacceptable".

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the length of clearance lanes prevented the victim being
observed while he worked.

Recommendations
The investigators found that the demining group was working at the request of the local
authority and in a way that met their need quickly, but stressed that the needs of the local
authority should not be given precedence over the employment of proper procedures and
drills.
The investigators recommended that the site be classified "high risk". They said that
prodding should be to a depth of 10cm and if that was not possible, "dogs or mechanical
devices" or excavation should be the method of working. They added that the Team Leader
should be reminded that caution should be used using shears, and that cutting should not
extend more than 50cm in front of the end-of-lane marker. As a minimum, they added, the
working deminer's partner should be able to see him while he works, and the site must be
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laid out to allow this. Lane length should not exceed 25 metres. The group should consider
using dogs to check lanes at deminer changeovers. A one day retraining course should be
carried out on prodding and tripwire feelers and all the group's deminers must be briefed on
safety measures and the appropriate SOPs.

Victim Report
Victim number: 275

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 40 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet,
Short visor

Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arms
minor Leg
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Above knee
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
A brief report by the medic recorded that he gave the victim "Analgin" i.m. and accompanied
him between hospitals (he was sedated at the first). The victim was "communicative" during
the treatment and evacuation.
Another document gave the opinion of a Tuzla hospital doctor and stated that the victim was
looked after immediately after the accident with an "infusion i.v. 500ml NaCl, amp. Trodon +
amp. Diazepam i.m.
A tourniquet was applied to his right upper leg and he was evacuated to the orthopaedic
clinic at Tuzla hospital.
The Accident investigators recorded that the victim's right leg was severely injured and his
left thigh and both arms were "less severe". In Tuzla hospital his right leg was amputated
above the knee.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the
victim was expected to work in an inappropriate (impossible) way. He was expected to work
through rubble with a prodder to a depth of 10cm and this is not realistic. The secondary
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cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because his tools and detector were not
appropriate.
The investigators' recommendations for the use of demining assets that the company did not
have, and retraining in unrelated drills was curious.
The amputation above the knee resulted from the victim having effectively knelt on the mine.

Related papers
Maps of the site were in the Accident file, including a detailed sketch map of the accident
site. There were also uninformative statements and a QA Monitor report observing minor
errors that had been corrected, and praising the demining group.
Photographs of large mine fragments found at the site were included with photographs of the
site.
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